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Précis of Truth-Conditional Pragmatics 
 
François Recanati 
 
 
In the middle of the twentieth-century so-called ‘ordinary language phi-
losophers’ (Austin, Strawson, Wittgenstein, and dozens of others) launched a 
sustained attack on the views of so-called ‘ideal-language’ philosophers — the 
founding fathers of analytic philosophy: Frege, Russell, the first Wittgenstein, 
and the logical positivists. The assault lasted for about twenty years — from 
the early forties to the late sixties. In his inaugural lecture as the Waynflete 
Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in Oxford, Strawson described the de-
bate as a ‘battle of the giants’. Eventually, ordinary language philosophers 
lost, and it was their opponents’ disciples — Davidson, Montague, Lewis etc. 
— who managed to build semantics for natural language on the foundations 
laid down by the founding fathers, and who thereby contributed to the devel-
opment of what is now a thriving discipline in linguistics. 
Ordinary language philosophers were not totally defeated, however. 
Many of their insights were actually taken on board — in particular the fol-
lowing two claims, which have become common ground among students of 
language: 
 
• The unit of speech is the illocutionary act. Assertion is only one illo-
cutionary act among others. 
 
• There is pervasive context-sensitivity in natural language: the content 
carried by a linguistic expression depends upon the context of utter-
ance and is liable to vary if the context changes. 
 
From the standpoint of ordinary language philosophy, the two claims 
go together. The content carried by an expression is the contribution it makes 
to the content of the sentence in which the expression occurs; and for ordi-
nary language philosophers the content of a sentence is nothing but the con-
tent of the speech act performed by uttering the sentence in context (see the 
‘Contextualist Principle’ below). The sentence type, in abstraction from the 
context of use, does not have determinate representational content but ab-
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stract grammatical properties which, by themselves, fall short of determining 
a graspable content.
1
 So, instead of focussing on the so-called ‘semantic’ re-
lation between the sentence (type) and the state of affairs it allegedly repre-
sents (its truth-conditions), they advocated a perspective shift. They argued that 
one should take a broader look and consider the ‘total speech act’ [Austin 
(1975)] because it is only in the context of a speech act that a sentence acquires 
a determinate content. In other words, the semantics of natural language can-
not be dissociated from its pragmatics. 
That the semantics of natural language cannot be dissociated from its 
pragmatics is something that, in a sense, has become common ground since 
Bar-Hillel first advocated a synthesis between the insights of the two camps 
[Bar-Hillel (1954)]. What has been widely acknowledged among semanticists 
since Bar-Hillel is that the compositional assignment of content to natural 
language expressions must appeal to a context parameter; that is enough to 
bring some ‘pragmatics’ into the semantics, in one sense of ‘pragmatics’. 
(For Montague, following Morris and Carnap, as soon as you bring the con-
text of use into the picture, you’re in the field of pragmatics.) But there is a 
stronger sense, closer to the views of ordinary language philosophers, in 
which it may be said that the semantics of natural language cannot be disso-
ciated from its pragmatics. 
What ordinary language philosophers thought was that content is (pri-
marily) a property of speech acts (or thought acts). Sentences only have con-
tent in a derivative manner. They endorsed a pragmaticized version of 
Frege’s context principle: 
 
Contextualist Principle 
 
Only in the context of a speech act does a sentence acquire a determi-
nate content.
2
  
 
The successors of Bar-Hillel and Montague reject the Contextualist Principle 
as incompatible with the project of building a systematic semantics for natu-
ral language. Their pragmaticization of semantics is much more limited and 
manageable: because of context-sensitivity, they appeal to a context parame-
ter and only assign contents to sentences in context, but they do so without 
bringing the illocutionary act into the picture, that is, without venturing into 
‘pragmatics’ in the more substantial sense — real pragmatics, as we might 
call it. They maintain a sharp demarcation between semantics and (real) 
pragmatics. 
Among the reasons why ordinary language philosophers lost is a popu-
lar argument which was successfully used against ordinary language philoso-
phers by Paul Grice. It is actually a counter-argument. Ordinary language 
philosophers held that sentences do not carry content independently of the 
speech act they are used to perform. It follows that context-sensitivity is not 
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merely the mark of a particular category of expressions (e.g. indexicals) but 
should affect all expressions, in virtue of the constitutive tie between speech 
acts and contents. Speech acts are context-bound, so contents, being constitu-
tively tied to speech acts, must be context-bound too. In support of this view, 
ordinary language philosophers pointed out that, as a matter of fact, sentences 
do not carry stable truth-conditions across contexts. Thus, in Introduction to 
Logical Theory, Strawson famously pointed out that a simple conjunctive 
sentence of the form ‘P and Q’ does not have fixed truth-conditions. Its truth-
conditions depend upon the context in a sense which has nothing to do with 
indexicality. In some contexts a temporal relation between the events de-
scribed by the conjuncts will be truth-conditionally relevant, but in other con-
texts not. That is so because truth-conditional content is not a property of the 
sentence, but a property of the speech act, sensitive to fine features of the 
context of use. Grice responded by appealing to the intuitive distinction be-
tween what a sentence means and what the speaker means — a distinction 
which can be maintained even if we hold (as Grice did) that sentence mean-
ing itself can ultimately be analysed in terms of speaker’s meaning (at the so-
called ‘metasemantic’ level). Sentence meaning is a conventional, stable 
property of the sentence. That is a property which speaker’s meaning does 
not have: there is no limit to what the speaker can mean, in a suitable context, 
by the utterance of a given sentence, so speaker’s meaning is maximally un-
stable. In between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning we find ‘what is 
said’. What is said, Grice tells us, departs from the (disambiguated) meaning 
of the sentence but does so only minimally. Grice and his followers accept 
the following principle: 
 
Minimality Principle 
 
The only unstable elements of what is said — the only elements which 
depend upon the context and can vary — are elements resulting from 
‘saturation’, i.e. from contextual assigning values to expressions whose 
conventional meaning carries a free variable to be contextually instanti-
ated or a slot to be contextually filled (e.g. an indexical) 
 
All the other aspects of utterance meaning that are context-dependent and un-
stable result from pragmatic processes that take place for purely pragmatic 
reasons. These extra ingredients of meaning are considered external to what 
is said: they are implicatures. 
In the ordinary language argument from the unstability of truth-conditional 
content, it is assumed that the unstable ingredients (e.g. the temporal relation be-
tween the events in the conjunction cases) belong to truth-conditional content; 
but if we follow Grice and use a notion of truth-conditional content, or ‘what 
is said’, which minimizes the distance between truth-conditional content and 
conventional sentence meaning in the manner suggested, then we will treat 
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the unstable ingredients as implicatures external to what is said (unless they 
can be shown to result from saturation). This allows truth-conditional content 
to stabilize instead of varying indefinitely. Grice’s suggestion, then, is that 
sentences do carry contents (in context), but that these contents are, or may 
be, distinct from the content of the speech acts the speaker performs. Speech 
acts contents are richer and more varied because they don’t obey the Mini-
mality Principle. They include implicatures in addition to semantic content in 
the strict and narrow sense. Thanks to the Gricean distinction between what 
is said (sentence content) and what is meant (speech act content), the ordi-
nary language philosophers’s attack on the traditional view that sentences 
have content can be resisted, and the Contextualist Principle rejected. 
In the eighties, however, a new debate about the extent of context-
sensitivity started and developed until, recently, it reached center stage in the 
philosophy of language.
3
 The key issue in the debate is the Minimality Prin-
ciple. Following Grice, ‘minimalists’ and their allies accept the Minimality 
Principle, while ‘contextualists’ reject it. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics is a 
contribution to that debate (on the contextualist side). 
In the new debate, contextualists like myself put forward an alternative 
notion of what is said, one that does not satisfy the Minimality Principle. As a 
result of that move, truth-conditional content becomes unstable again. Many 
things which the minimalists take to be implicatures are reintegrated into 
truth-conditional content with the status of ‘modulations’ [Recanati (2004)]. 
Modulations are (the effects of) pragmatic processes of sense-adjustment 
which are not linguistically mandated (in contrast to the contextual assign-
ment of values to indexicals) yet affect the intuitive truth-conditions of utter-
ances (in contrast to conversational implicatures, which remain external to 
truth-conditional content). Modulation processes come in several varieties 
[Recanati (1993), (2004), Carston (1997)]: free enrichment, whereby, words 
are contextually understood in a more specific sense than the sense they pos-
sess in virtue of the conventions of the language; loosening, whereby words 
are contextually given a less specific sense than the conventional sense; and 
predicate transfer [Nunberg (1995)], whereby a general term comes to con-
tribute a property distinct from, though characterizable in terms of, the prop-
erty conventionally associated with the term (thus, in ‘I am parked out back’, 
the words ‘parked out back’ contribute the property λx x’s car is parked out 
back rather than the literally encoded property λx x is parked out back). 
To be sure, there remain genuine implicatures which the contextualists 
themselves treat as external to truth-conditional content. However context-
dependent what is said is (on the contextualist conception), it is always pos-
sible for the speaker to mean something over and above what he or she says. 
But this is not enough to secure the stability of truth-conditional content. To 
systematically reject the unstable ingredients out of truth-conditional content, 
as the minimalists are willing to do, it is not sufficient to invoke the 
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said/meant distinction: one needs, in addition, the Minimality Principe as a 
specific constraint on ‘what is said’. But the contextualists reject that con-
straint, so it cannot be invoked against them without begging the question. 
They reject that constraint because they take the speech act to be the source, 
or one of the sources, of truth-conditional content. From the contextualist 
standpoint, there is no reason why the speech act should not be allowed to 
contribute aspects of truth-conditional content that are not derivable from the 
linguistic properties of the sentence. 
Are there actually ‘modulations’, with the properties I ascribe to them 
(optional yet truth-conditionally relevant)? In Direct Reference and again in 
Literal Meaning, I argued that there are. In Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, I 
provide a collection of case studies in support of that conclusion. In the more 
theoretical chapters of the book, and especially in chapter 1, I make a case for 
integrating pragmatics — real pragmatics, i.e. pragmatics having to do with 
speech acts and speaker’s meaning — into the compositional machinery 
which computes truth-conditional content. Modulated meanings, I claim, are 
the building blocks out of which truth-conditional content is made. 
The view that there are modulations (and that we should therefore reject 
the Minimality Principe) is what I call Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (TCP). 
But this view is more modest than another one, directly inspired by the Contex-
tualist Principle. The other view is what I called ‘Contextualism’ in Direct Ref-
erence, and ‘Radical Contextualism’ in Literal Meaning and Truth-Conditional 
Pragmatics. Let me say a word about the difference between the two views. 
TCP says that the speech act contributes aspects of truth-conditional 
content that are not derivable from the linguistic properties of the sentence 
(even if we take on board the mandatory assignment of contextual values to 
indexicals and free variables). But this is compatible with the idea that the 
linguistic properties of the uttered sentence (plus saturation) do determine a 
minimal, truth-evaluable content, which may or may not coincide with the 
content of the locutionary act. Radical Contextualism rejects that idea. It 
takes content to be primarily a speech act notion: sentences possess contents 
only insofar as they inherit the content of the speech acts they are used to per-
form. It follows that sentences by themselves do not carry (even minimal) 
truth-evaluable contents. They carry schematic meanings which only deter-
mine truth-evaluable contents in the context of a speech act. Radical Contex-
tualism entails TCP, but not the other way round. 
I discuss Radical Contextualism extensively in Literal Meaning (chap-
ters 6 and 9), and plan to defend it in the future more or less along the lines of 
an earlier paper of mine [Recanati (1994)]; but in Truth-Conditional Prag-
matics my aim is to show that the weaker position, TCP, is compatible with 
the project of building a systematic semantics. It is true that truth-conditional 
content is susceptible to indefinite variation in the TCP framework, but this 
variation is traceable to a process of modulation which, like saturation, can be 
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integrated into the compositional process which maps the syntactic string to 
the content it contextually expresses. The key idea is that the content of a 
complex expression is a function of the modulated contents of its parts (chap-
ter 1). In chapter 4 I discuss various ways of construing modulation processes 
from a cognitive point of view. 
The linguistic phenomena I discuss in the book are: verb-object combi-
nations in chapter 1; adjective-noun combinations (with special attention to 
non-intersective adjectives, including privatives, and to gradable adjectives) 
in chapter 2; meteorological verbs and their valency in chapter 3; embedded 
implicatures in chapter 5; indexicality and semantic under-determination in 
chapter 6; reported speech, irony and quotation in chapters 6-8. In each case I 
show the benefits one can draw from allowing ‘free’ (though potentially sys-
tematic) pragmatic processes of modulation. The processes in question come 
in several varieties, as I said: free enrichment, predicate transfer, loosening. 
Other pragmatic processes, such as relativisation to situations (a process at 
work in contextual domain restriction) and context-shift (the process in terms 
of which I analyse irony, hybrid quotation and certain cases of indexical 
shift), are also brought to bear on the analysis of the linguistic phenomena. 
Context-shifts are a particularly important topic, which occupies the last 
three chapters of the book. This may give a slight feeling of disunity. But 
there are good reasons why these chapters are included in Truth-Conditional 
Pragmatics. First, context-shifts illustrate the role of pragmatics at the pre-
semantic level. In the TCP framework, pragmatics is involved at three levels 
in utterance interpretation: the pre-semantic level (disambiguation and con-
text-shift), the semantic level (saturation and modulation) and the post-
semantic level (conversational implicature and irony). Second, context-shifts 
give rise to free enrichment in phenomena such as mixed quotation (chapters 
7 and 8). Third, context-shifts, when they occur locally, map the character of 
the operand (the expression whose context of interpretation is shifted) to the 
character of the resulting ‘hybrid’ (chapter 8). This is a form of modulation at 
the level of character, similar to that which occurs in predicate transfer. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Linguists can describe the semantic properties of sentences like all other 
grammatical properties, but the innocent language users know these properties only 
implicitly. The innocent language user cannot grasp the conventional meaning of a 
Précis of Truth-Conditional Pragmatics                                                          7 
 
sentence (a subset of its grammatical properties) in the sense in which he or she grasps 
the content expressed by a sentence in the context of a speech act, real or imaginary. 
2 The Contextualist Principle can be found in Wittgenstein, who wrote: ‘It is on-
ly in use that the proposition has its sense’ [On Certainty, §10]. According to Conant, 
Wittgenstein ‘seeks to generalize Frege’s context principle so that it applies not only 
to words (and their role within the context of a significant proposition) but also to sen-
tences (and their role within the context of circumstances of significant use or — as 
Wittgenstein prefers to call them — language games. The possibility of such a gener-
alization already played an important (if somewhat subterranean) role in the work of 
Frege and the early Wittgenstein’ [Conant (1998), p. 233]. 
3 The following books published within a very short period of time give an idea 
of the intensity of the minimalism/contextualism debate in early twenty-first century 
philosophy of language: Borg (2004), Recanati (2004), Cappelen and Lepore (2005), 
Predelli (2005), Stanley (2005), Preyer and Peter (eds.) (2005) and (2007). 
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